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Roberto Alvarez and Holger Görg 
 
Abstract  
This paper examines the link between multinational enterprises and employment growth at the plant-
level. We investigate in detail the comparative response of multinationals and domestic firms to an 
economic crisis, using the empirical setting of a well defined case of economic slowdown in Chile as a 
natural experiment. In our empirical analysis we find that employment growth in manufacturing plants 
has been drastically reduced during the economic crisis. More importantly, we do not find evidence that 
multinationals react to the economic crisis differently than do domestic firms. Our findings hold in a 
number of robustness tests, in which we also investigate the role of access to finance. The results are in 
contrast to the idea that multinationals are less affected by an economic crisis and that they may be able 
to act as stabilizers in developing countries. 
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In this paper we investigate whether multinationals react differently to economic crises than domestic 
firms, in terms of employment adjustment at the firm level.  Little is known about the comparative 
reactions of these two types of firms to economic crisis, especially in terms of employment.  This may be 
crucial for understanding why some countries are more able to recover quickly from recessions. 
Our paper investigates in detail the comparative response of multinationals and domestic firms to an 
economic crisis, using the empirical setting of a well defined case of economic slowdown in Chile.  After 
growing for more than a decade at 7 percent per year, the Chilean economy was hit by the international 
financial crisis in the late 1990s.  In 1998, the economy expanded at a lower rate of 3.2 percent, and 1999 
experienced its first recession in two decades (-0.8 percent of GDP growth).  Unemployment grew from 
5.3 percent in 1997 to 8.3 percent in 2000, reaching a peak of 8.9 per cent in 1999.  We use this crisis as 
a natural experiment to examine the differences in employment growth between multinationals and 
domestic firms, and how this is affected by the economic crisis.  We use firm level data for Chile and apply 
a difference-in-differences approach in which employment growth for multinationals is compared to 
domestic firms in two different time periods: one of rapid growth and one of growth slowdown.  To the best 
of our knowledge, this is the first in-depth empirical study of this issue using micro-level data. 
Why would we expect multinationals to react differently than domestic plants?  One reason is that foreign 
firms may be less dependent on domestic finance in their operations.  If this were true, we should observe 
that the impact of economic crisis differs according to the needs of financing.  To detect such a difference, 
we use measures of external dependence for 3-digit ISIC industries and analyze whether multinationals 
are more prone to grow in industries where external financing is more important.  Furthermore, we 
investigate whether a high dependence on interest payments for a firm is important in this regard.   
Another potential reason is that multinationals are more volatile because they can move production 
facilities easily between different countries.  On the other hand, however, one may take a more 
benevolent view of multinationals and suggest that their response may not be different from domestic 
firms.  After all, substantial sunk costs involved in FDI may imply that multinationals are unlikely to 
respond strongly to short term changes in host country conditions and behave more like domestic firms.  
Given these different theoretical priors, it appears worthwhile to turn to empirical evidence.   
In our empirical analysis we find that employment growth in manufacturing plants has been drastically 
reduced during the economic crisis.  Compared to the period 1990-1995, plant employment growth is 
between 13.5 and 23.6 percent lower in the late 1990s.  More importantly, we do not find evidence that 
multinationals react to the economic crisis differently than do domestic firms.  Extending the baseline 
analysis, we analyze whether multinationals are more prone to grow in industries where external financing 
is more important.  Furthermore, we use a measure of a firm’s dependence on interest payments to check 
whether this has any impact on employment growth.  We dot not find evidence in this regard.  Our findings 
are, therefore, in contrast with the idea that multinational firms are less affected by economic crisis and 
may be able to act as stabilizers in developing countries. 
 1. Introduction 
  Increasing levels of foreign direct investment (FDI) in the world economy have spurred 
considerable policy and academic interest into the determinants and consequences of this 
phenomenon.  Governments in both developed and developing countries generally seem to 
view inward FDI as highly desirable.  There is plenty of evidence that many countries actively 
promote inward FDI through relaxations of investment regulations, or investment incentives 
(UN 2003).  What is the impact of FDI on host countries? How well justified is promoting FDI 
for developing countries? These are very important questions from a policy point of view. 
Most of the research on development effects of inward FDI in the host country has focused so 
far on micro-level productivity and wage spillovers, development of indigenous firms, and 
aggregate economic growth.
1   
  In this paper we stress a different mechanism by which inward FDI, or more specifically 
the activities of foreign multinationals, may have an impact on host country development.  In 
particular, we investigate whether multinationals react differently to economic crises than 
domestic firms, in terms of employment adjustment at the firm level.  Little is known about the 
comparative reactions of these two types of firms to economic crisis
2, especially in terms of 
employment.  This may be crucial for understanding why some countries are more able to 
recover quickly from recessions. 
  In an early paper, McAleese and Counahan (1979) argue that multinationals may introduce 
instability into a host economy during an economic crisis, as it is easier for them to transfer 
production facilities internationally than it is for domestic firms.  On the other hand, however, 
they point out that if one regards multinationals purely as profit maximizing multi-plant firms 
then there may be no strong case for arguing that they should be more unstable than domestic 
firms.  Performing a simple empirical analysis by looking at differences in aggregate 
employment growth rates for Ireland they do not find any differences in employment 
adjustment between the two types of firms during a recession.  In a more recent paper, Desai 
et. al. (2004) show that US multinationals located in emerging markets increase operations 
more than domestic firms in the presence of a currency crisis.  Hence, rather than increasing 
instability they tend to impact positively on the host country during such a crisis.  They argue 
                                                 
1 See Javorcik (2004), Barrios et al. (2005), Aitken et al. (1996), Alfaro et al. (2004) for recent examples.   
2 An exception is Blalock et. al. (2005). They analyze the impact of financial crisis on investment for domestic 
and foreign owned firms in Indonesia. 
  1that this is due to multinationals being less financially constrained than domestic firms (see 
also Harrison and McMillan, 2003) which allows them to expand economic activity during 
currency crisis. 
  Our paper relates to these earlier studies and investigates in detail the comparative response 
of multinationals and domestic firms to an economic crisis, using the empirical setting of a 
well defined case of economic slowdown in Chile.  After growing for more than a decade at 7 
percent per year, the Chilean economy was hit by the international financial crisis in the late 
1990s.  In 1998, the economy expanded at a lower rate of 3.2 percent, and 1999 experienced its 
first recession in two decades (-0.8 percent of GDP growth).  Unemployment grew from 5.3 
percent in 1997 to 8.3 percent in 2000, reaching a peak of 8.9 per cent in 1999 (Cowan et. al. 
2005).  We use this crisis as a natural experiment to examine the differences in employment 
growth between multinationals and domestic firms, and how this is affected by the economic 
crisis.  We use firm level data for Chile and apply a difference-in-differences approach in 
which employment growth for multinationals is compared to domestic firms in two different 
time periods: one of rapid growth and one of growth slowdown.  To the best of our knowledge, 
this is the first in-depth empirical study of this issue using micro-level data.
3
  Why would we expect multinationals to react differently than domestic plants?  One reason 
is that foreign firms may be less dependent on domestic finance in their operations (Desai et 
al., 2004; Harrison and McMillan, 2003).  If this were true, we should observe that the impact 
of economic crisis differs according to the needs of financing
4.  To detect such a difference, we 
use measures of external dependence for 3-digit ISIC industries, developed by Rajan and 
Zingales (1998) and analyze whether multinationals are more prone to grow in industries 
where external financing is more important.  Furthermore, we investigate whether a high 
dependence on interest payments for a firm is important in this regard.   
  Another potential reason is that multinationals are more volatile because they can move 
production facilities easily between different countries (Flamm, 1984).  On the other hand, 
however, one may take a more benevolent view of multinationals and suggest that their 
response may not be different from domestic firms (McAleese and Counahan, 1979).  After all, 
substantial sunk costs involved in FDI may imply that multinationals are unlikely to respond 
                                                 
3 Levinsohn (1993) is an early paper examining the effect of trade liberalization in Chile on employment growth.   
4 At the aggregate level, Braun and Larrain (2005) show evidence that industries that are more dependent on 
external finance are hit harder during recessions. We focus here on the effects at the plant level. 
  2strongly to short term changes in host country conditions and behave more like domestic firms.  
Given these different theoretical priors, it appears worthwhile to turn to empirical evidence.   
  In our empirical analysis we find that employment growth in manufacturing plants has been 
drastically reduced during the economic crisis.  Compared to the period 1990-1995, plant 
employment growth is between 13.5 and 23.6 percent lower in the late 1990s.  More 
importantly, we do not find evidence that multinationals react to the economic crisis differently 
than do domestic firms.  Extending the baseline analysis, we use the measures developed by 
Rajan and Zingales (1998) and analyze whether multinationals are more prone to grow in 
industries where external financing is more important.  Furthermore, we use a measure of a 
firm’s dependence on interest payments to check whether this has any impact on employment 
growth.  We dot not find evidence in this regard.  Our findings are, therefore, in contrast with 
the idea that multinational firms are less affected by economic crisis and may be able to act as 
stabilizers in developing countries. 
  The remainder of the paper is structured as follows.  In section 2, we present our data and 
some preliminary evidence on employment growth for domestic and multinational plants.  In 
section 3, we discuss our econometric strategy and present our main results.  In section 4, we 
examine the role of external financing in explaining differences in plant performance.  Finally, 
section 5 concludes. 
 
2.  Data and Preliminary Empirics 
  The analysis is based on the Annual National Industrial Survey (ENIA) carried out by the 
National Institute of Statistics of Chile (INE). This plant level survey is representative of the 
universe of Chilean manufacturing plants with 10 or more workers. The dataset is available for 
the period 1979 to 2000, but we have information for exports and foreign ownership only since 
1990. Given that we are interested in studying the relationship between plant growth and 
multinationals, and that we also explore some differences between multinational exporters and 
non-exporters, we use information for the period 1990 through 2000.  
  The INE updates the survey annually by incorporating plants that started operating during 
the year and excluding those plants that stopped operating for any reason.  Each  plant  has  a 
unique identification number which allow us to identify entry and exit. For each plant and year, 
ENIA collects data on production, value added, sales, employment and wages (production and 
  3non-production), exports, investment, depreciation, energy usage, foreign licenses, and other 
plant characteristics. Plant ownership is identified by the percentage of capital owned by 
foreigners. We define a foreign plant as one with any foreign ownership. Most plants, however, 
have majority foreign ownership
5. In addition, plants are classified according to the 
International Standard Industrial Classification (ISIC) rev 2.  Using 4-digit industry level price 
deflators, all financial variables were converted to constant 1985 pesos.  Plants do not report 
information on capital stock, thus it was necessary to construct this variable using the perpetual 
inventory method for each plant. 
  Table 1 presents the distribution of plants according to ownership and export orientation.  
We take export activity into account as the recent literature on firm level heterogeneity 
suggests that in a comparison of plants, domestic exporters may have characteristics that are 
somewhere between purely domestic firms and multinationals (e.g., Helpman et al., 2004).  
Furthermore, export oriented multinationals may behave differently to other multinationals in 
the presence of an economic crisis, as they are not reliant on the domestic output market.   
  Our data show that in 1990, foreign plants only represented 4.2 percent of total plants in the 
manufacturing industry.  Their participation increased to 5.9 and 6.1 percent in 1995 and 2000, 
respectively.  The majority of domestic plants are non-exporters, while more than 50 percent of 
multinationals export.  Also, in general the importance of exporters has increased in domestic 
and multinational plants between 1990 and 2000.  Although multinationals are relatively less 
important in terms of plant numbers they represent a large and growing share of employment, 
value-added, and exports as shown in Figure 1. Between 1990 and 2000, multinationals 
increased their importance in manufacturing employment from about 10 percent to more than 
15 percent. Over the same period, their participation in exports and value-added rose almost 
three times.  In 2000, foreign firms accounted for more than 30 per cent of manufacturing 
exports and value-added. 
[Table 1 and Figure 1 here] 
  The main issue of this paper is the question as to whether employment growth is different 
between domestic and foreign plants. In order to get a first impression of this, Table 2 
compares employment growth for foreign and domestic plants. We are particularly interested 
in analyzing whether there are statistically significant differences in the (unconditional) 
                                                 
5 The mean and median of foreign ownership are 77.7 and 100 percent, respectively. 
  4employment growth for different types of plants and time periods.  Panel A of Table 2 
compares domestic and foreign-owned plants.  For both groups of plants, there is a reduction in 
employment growth between 1990-1995 and 1995-2000.  Also, for both periods, we do not 
find that employment growth differs significantly for domestic and multinational plants.  This 
may suggest that the negative effects of the slowdown of the economy hit both types of plants 
in a similar way.  
  Recall that the data in Table 1 showed that the majority of domestic plants are non-
exporters, while for multinationals the distribution between exporters and non-exporters is 
almost even.  As exporters are generally more efficient than non-exporters (see Alvarez and 
Lopez, 2005, for Chilean evidence) we also distinguish employment growth for plants by 
export orientation.  As shown in panel B, there is also a reduction in employment growth for 
exporters in the crisis period, and we do not find evidence that multinational employment 
response differs significantly from domestic plants. 
  In sum, preliminary evidence in Table 2 suggests that there are no significant differences in 
employment growth between multinational and domestic plants in either the growth or 
slowdown period.  However, these are unconditional averages, which may merely reflect the 
effects of other plant or industry characteristics that are different for foreign and domestic 
plants.  There are two main factors that could make a difference in employment response 
across plants.  First, multinationals and exporters tend to be larger and more productive than 
domestic plants (Lipsey, 2004; Bernard and Jensen, 1999; Alvarez and Lopez, 2005).  Second, 
we are comparing employment growth only for surviving firms.  In fact, Alvarez and Görg 
(2005) find for Chilean plant level data that, once controlling for size and other covariates, 
foreign multinationals are more likely to exit than comparable domestic plants, especially in 
the crisis period.
6  In order to disentangle the effects of other covariates from the effect of 
ownership, we therefore turn to an econometric modeling of the determinants of employment 
growth.  In this estimation we also correct for the potential sample selection problem 
introduced through exiting plants.   
[Table 2 here] 
 
3 Econometric Methodology and Results 
                                                 
6 Bernard and Sjöholm (2003) find similar evidence for Indonesia. 
  5  Our identification strategy is to consider the economic crisis in the late 1990s as a natural 
experiment and investigate its effect on plant level employment growth.  We allow the crisis to 
impact differently on multinationals and domestic plants’ growth trajectories.  To do so, we use 
a difference-in-differences approach
7 by estimating the following employment growth 
equation: 
  =    (1)  ) ln( ) ln( s it it L L − − it crisis s it crisis s it s t D MNC D MNC Z ε γ γ γ δ α + + + + + − − − * 3 2 1
'
  where the dependent variable is the log difference in employment in plant i between t and t-
s (s ≥ 1).
8   Z is a vector of plant’s characteristics, MNC is a dummy variable for plants that are 
affiliates of foreign multinationals, and Dcrisis is a dummy for the period of economic crisis. 
  The potential differences in employment growth between multinationals and domestic 
plants are captured by 1 γ . In the case that multinationals, independent of the period under 
study, tend to grow faster than domestic plants, we expect  1 γ  to be positive. The overall effect 
of the economic crisis on employment growth is given by 2 γ , which is expected to be negative.  
If multinationals are more able to absorb negative shocks (e.g., because they are less likely to 
be financially constrained), employment growth in these plants should be higher than for 
domestic firms in the crisis period. In such a case, we expect  3 γ  to be positive. On the other 
hand,  3 γ  may turn out to be negative if multinationals are indeed more footloose than domestic 
firms and therefore more likely to contract employment in the crisis period.  The third option is 
that  3 γ  is equal to zero, indicating that there are no differences in the response between 
multinationals and domestic firms to the crisis.   
  The control variables in vector Z are those that have been found in the literature to affect 
plant employment growth.
9 In particular, we include initial differences in total factor 
productivity, age, size (measured in terms of employment), and a dummy variable indicating 
whether or not the plant is an exporter.  For example, Dunne and Hughes (1994), Dunne et al. 
(1989) and Evans (1987) show the importance of size and age of a plant for growth.  TFP and 
the export dummy are included as it is generally found that more productive firms, and 
exporters, are generally larger and perform “better” than others (e.g, Bernard and Jensen, 
                                                 
7 See Meyer (1995) for an overview of this methodology. 
8 This definition of the dependent variable also wipes out any plant specific effects that determine employment 
levels.   
9 A table with variable definitions and a correlation table can be found in the Appendix.   
  61999). These variables are also important for controlling for differences between domestic and 
multinationals firms. If foreign firms are larger or more productive, not controlling for these 
factors may bias the parameter associated to foreign ownership. In such a case, we may 
attribute an impact to foreign ownership that could be actually capturing their superior 
characteristics in terms of size or productivity. 
  In a first approach at estimating equation (1), we only consider two observations per plant – 
pre-crisis employment growth between 1990 and 1995 and the corresponding crisis 
employment performance between 1995 and 2000.
10 We define the economic crisis to have hit 
Chile at the end of the 1990’s, i.e., the variable Dcrisis takes on the value 1 for the period 1995 
to 2000.   
  In our estimation we face a sample selection problem due to the fact that employment 
growth is only observed for surviving firms between t-s and t.  To deal with this problem, we 
use the common approach of estimating a Heckman selection model.  We estimate jointly the 
outcome and selection equations using a maximum likelihood procedure.  The selection 
equation includes the same covariates as the growth regression and a number of industry 
characteristics as additional regressors.  These are the minimum efficient scale in the industry, 
the Herfindahl index as a measure of industry concentration, and a measure of the relative 
importance of multinationals in an industry.
11   
  Table 3 presents these basic regression results, where all the explanatory variables are 
measured at the beginning of the two periods (i.e. t-5). Column (3.1) shows the estimates of a 
simple OLS regression to provide a baseline against which to compare the estimates obtained 
from the sample selection model in columns 3.2 and 3.3.  Note from the last row that the null 
hypothesis of independence between both equations is rejected at 10 per cent and 5 percent 
respectively, which implies that sample selection is a relevant issue in our sample.  
  The difference between columns 3.2 and 3.3 is the inclusion of the industry growth rate to 
control for differences in growth across different sectors.  The regressions produce similar 
results in the different specifications.  Age and initial size are negatively related to employment 
growth, a finding in line with the literature (e.g., Evans, 1987, Dunne et al., 1989).  Plants with 
higher TFP and exporters, on the other hand, grow faster than others, again in line with our 
                                                 
10 In other words, subscript s in equation (1) is equal to 5.  We use an alternative definition of s = 1, i.e., annual 
growth rates and lagged variables, as a robustness check in Section 4.  Results appear robust to such changes.   
11 See, e.g., Görg and Strobl (2003) for a discussion of these variables in the context of modelling plant survival.   
  7expectations.  The crisis dummy has a negative coefficient which indicates that employment 
growth slowed down during the period of recession compared to the early 1990s.  The impact 
of the economic crisis is also economically significant.  Compared to the period 1990-1995, 
plant employment growth is between 13.5 and 23.6 percent lower in the late 1990s.  By 
contrast, we do not find any statistically significant coefficient on the multinationality dummy. 
In other words, the employment growth trajectory of plants belonging to foreign multinationals 
is not different from that of domestic plants.  Importantly, we also find that the coefficient on 
the interaction term MNC * Dcrisis, is statistically insignificant, indicating that multinationals do 
not react any different in terms of employment growth to the economic crisis than do domestic 
plants.
12
[Table 3 here] 
  Table 4 provides a robustness check of our results thus far by changing the specification in 
two respects.  In the estimations reported we use a different definition of the dependent 
variable.  Specifically, we follow the literature on job creation and destruction (e.g., Davis and 
Haltiwanger, 1989) and define the growth rate as net job flows between t-5 and t.
13  
Furthermore, we acknowledge that there is a potential problem of using initial size as a 
regressor in the growth regression, as this may lead to “regression towards the mean”.  As an 
alternative we use average size over the period instead (e.g., Konings et. al., 1996).  
  Table 4 again reports simple OLS estimates in column (4.1) and the Heckman selection 
model in column (4.2).  A comparison of Tables 3 and 4 brings up two main points.  Firstly, 
using average size instead of initial size changes the coefficient on the size variable from 
negative to positive.  This is in line with related studies and is to be expected (Konings et.al. 
1996).  Secondly, the use of the different dependent variable and the different regressor do not 
change the main result of our analysis thus far.  The economic crisis has a negative and 
statistically significant effect on plant growth, but this effect is not different for foreign 
multinationals and domestic owned plants.
14  Hence, our results appear robust to the different 
variable definitions. 
[Table 4 here] 
                                                 
12 However, the selection equation suggests that multinationals are more likely to exit than domestic plants during 
the crisis. 
13 The exact definition is provided in the note to Table 4.   
14 Furthermore, all other coefficients, apart from the export dummy, are similar in Table 3 and Table 4.   
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4 Role of external financing and robustness checks 
  One rationale for expecting differences in the reaction to the economic crisis between 
multinationals and domestic firms is that access to external finance becomes more difficult for 
firms in a downturn and that multinationals are less dependent on domestic finance in their 
operations (Desai et al., 2004; Harrison and McMillan, 2003) and, hence, they should be less 
affected in a crisis.  If this were indeed true, we would also expect to observe that the impact of 
an economic crisis differs across firms and industries according to their needs of financing.  
While we do not have any detailed information on the external financing requirements at the 
level of the firm we try to take this point into account in two ways.  Firstly, we make use of an 
identification strategy pioneered by Rajan and Zingales (1998) to measure external finance 
dependence of industries.  Specifically, we use their measures of external dependence for U.S. 
plants at 3-digit industries, and analyze whether multinationals are more prone to grow in 
industries where external financing is more important.
15   
  To test whether there are differences in employment growth trajectories across industries 
according to their degree of external financing dependence, we estimate a variant of equation 
(1) by including interactions of the crisis and multinational dummies with the variable for 
needs of external finance (EXD) computed by Rajan and Zingales (1998).  
) ln( ) ln( s it it L L − − =    (2) 
it I crisis s it I s it
crisis I crisis s it crisis s it s t
EXD D MNC EXD MNC
D EXD D MNC D MNC Z
ε γ γ
γ γ γ γ δ α
+ + +






4 3 2 1
'
  In the case that firms grow less (more) during the crisis in industries with high dependence 
on external financing,  4 γ is expected to be negative (positive).  If multinationals, independently 
of the period, grow faster than domestic plants in industries more dependent on external 
financing we expect γ5 to be positive.  If multinationals were able to overcome the potential 
negative effects of the economic crisis by external financing from abroad, the impact of a crisis 
                                                 
15 This variable is defined as the fraction of capital expenditures not financed with cash flow operations, and it is 
computed for the median of US firms at 3-digit ISIC industries (some at 4-digit). To be consistent, we only use 
information at 3-digit level. Rajan and Zingales (1998) discuss at length the argument that this measure which is 
calculated using data for US firms can serve as a useful measure at the industry level for other countries as well.  
One critique with applying this approach in our context is that external dependence may also reflect different 
growth opportunities across industries.  In fact, not all sectors are equally affected by an economic crisis.  To take 
this into account we control for industry growth in our estimations. 
  9should be lower for multinationals in those industries that are more dependent on external 
financing.  In such a case, we expect  6 γ  to be positive. 
  Results of estimating equation (2) are shown in Table 5, columns 5.1 to 5.4.  Columns (5.1) 
and (5.3) present results using the log difference of employment levels, as shown in the 
equation, as dependent variable, and initial size as a regressor.  Columns (5.2) and (5.4) 
employ the alternative growth rate and average size as regressor.  Overall, results again suggest 
that firms grow less during the crisis, as indicated by the negative coefficient on the crisis 
dummy.  In terms of the importance of multinationals we find, again, no evidence that they are 
affected differently in terms of employment growth than domestic firms.  Moreover, there are 
also no apparent differences between the two types of firms depending on industry financing 
needs.  Multinationals are not growing any faster (or slower) than domestic firms in industries 
that are more dependent on external financing.  
 [Table 5 here] 
  While our data do not provide us with detailed information on firm’s financing 
requirements we have one piece of information that may be considered as a (less than perfect) 
proxy.  This is the value of interest payments as a proportion of total sales.  We consider this 
variable as a crude measure of for access to capital markets and, hence, the role of external 
finance at the level of the firm to provide a comparison to the above results which measure 
financial dependence at the industry level.   
  Results of these regressions are presented in columns (5.5) and (5.6).  In column (5.5) we 
find that the interaction term of MNC and interest payments is negative indicating the 
multinationals grow less the more dependent they are on interest payments.  However, note 
that this result is not robust to the alternative definition of the dependent variable, and the size 
variable in column (5.6).  Otherwise, all regressors including the interest payment variable are 
statistically insignificant.  What remains robust, however, is the finding that firms grow less 
during the crisis, and that this effect is no different for foreign multinational firms.   
  Tables 6, 7 and 8 present the results of further robustness checks.  In Table 6 we use an 
alternative measurement for differences in financing needs across industries. In a similar way 
to Rajan and Zingales (1998), Raddatz (2006) has calculated measures of short-run financing 
needs capturing the importance of working capital in the production process. It could be argued 
that this liquidity constraints could be potentially more important for firms facing a downturn 
  10and even more relevant for one developing economy like Chile. We use two of these variables 
for estimating equation (2). First, we use the relative importance of inventories for each 
industry, which is computed as the inventory to sales ratio (Columns 6.1. and 6.2). Second, we 
a measure of cash conversion cycle, which is calculated as  the length in days between the 
moment a firm pays for its raw materials and the moment it is paid for the sale of its final 
output during the normal course of operations (Columns 6.3 and 6.4). For both variables, we 
use the term liquidity needs. 
  Overall, the results show the negative effect of the crisis on employment growth. The 
parameter for the interaction between crisis and multinational dummy is positive, indicating 
that foreign plants would be less affected by a crisis. Note, however, that the parameter is only 
significant at 10 percent when we control for average size. Interestingly, the interaction 
between liquidity needs and MNC is positive, though barely significant in (6.2) and (6.4), 
suggesting that multinationals tend to grow faster in those industries where short-run financing 
needs are more important.  If multinationals are indeed less financially constrained than 
domestic firms then this result is expected.  More importantly, given our identification strategy, 
is that the triple interaction is negative and always significant. This result indicates that, even 
though multinationals tend to grow faster in high working capital demanding sectors, this is not 
specially true in time of crisis. In fact, our negative sign for this triple interaction would 
indicate that MNC´s in these sectors tend to be more adversely affected than domestic plants. 
In sum, we do not find evidence that superior access to financing is an advantage for foreign 
owned firms when facing an economic crisis. 
[Table 6 here] 
  We explore the robustness of our result using employment growth as the change between t-
1 and t, i.e., we have annual growth rates instead of the five yearly rates used before (s = 1).  
All regressors are defined for t-1 also.  In this case, our crisis dummy corresponds to years 
1998, 1999, and 2000.  The results, shown in Table 7, are largely comparable to the previous 
findings with one main exception
16.  We no longer find a statistically significant coefficient on 
the EXD*Crisis interaction term, although the coefficient is still positive as before.  In all other 
respects, results are similar to the ones obtained before.  In particular, we still find that 
                                                 
16 For comparison with our evidence in previous sections, in Tables 7 and 8 we use the Rajan and Zingales 
(1998)´s measure of financing dependence. 
  11employment growth slows down during the crisis, and that this effect does not appear to be 
different for foreign multinationals and domestic firms.   
[Table 7 here] 
  A further possible criticism with the above regressions is that employment size measured as 
a continuous variable is endogenous in the growth equation.  This may be a particular concern 
with initial size, less so with average size.  As a robustness check we therefore use another 
alternative measure of size.  Similar to Levinsohn (1993) we define four size categories and 
generate four dummy variables for size classes, which are included in the regression.  Table 8 
shows the results of these estimations.  Firms with less than 50 employees are the base 
categories.  As can be seen, all size dummies are negative and statistically significant, in line 
with our previous results.  More importantly, our previous results on the impact of a crisis on 
employment growth are robust to this alternative specification.
17
[Table 8 here] 
 
5 Conclusions 
  This paper investigates in detail the comparative response in terms of employment growth 
of multinationals and domestic firms to an economic crisis.  To do so we use the economic 
slowdown in Chile in the late 1990s as a natural experiment.  We use firm level data for Chile 
and apply a difference-in-difference approach in which employment growth in our treated 
group, multinationals, is compared to a control group, domestic firms, in two different time 
periods: one of rapid growth and one of growth slowdown.   
  In our empirical analysis we find that employment growth in manufacturing plants has been 
drastically reduced during the economic crisis.  Compared to the period 1990-1995, plant 
employment growth is between 13.5 and 23.6 percent lower in the late 1990s.  More 
importantly, we do not find evidence that multinationals react to the economic crisis differently 
than do domestic firms.  We also investigate whether access to finance matters.  However, our 
analysis does not provide robust evidence to this extent.   
                                                 
17 In a final robustness check, we distinguished domestic and foreign firms into four categories: domestic 
exporters, domestic non-exporters, multinational exporters, multinational non-exporters and interacted the crisis 
dummy with these four dummy variables separately.  Results, which are shown in the appendix, show that we do 
not find any differences in the reaction of these four groups of firms to the crisis, in terms of employment growth.   
  12  Our findings are, therefore, in contrast with the idea that multinational firms are less 
affected by an economic crisis and may be able to act as stabilizers in developing countries.  
On the other hand, our results also imply that a fear, that multinationals are more footloose, and 
employment in foreign firms more precarious, is not borne out by the evidence.  This has 
important consideration for an evaluation of the potential benefits of attracting multinationals.  
Multinationals, while potentially bringing new technology and other benefits to the economy 
are no different to domestic firms in terms of employment growth when it comes to their 
potential reactions to negative shocks to the economy.  Hence our results show that there is no 
evidence to suggest that multinationals may pull out more quickly than domestic firms when 
the economy is hit by a negative shock.  
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Figure 1: Importance of Multinationals in Manufacturing Industry 






























  17Table 1: Plant Distributions by Nationality Types 
 1990  1995  2000 
  Plants % Plants %  Plants  % 
Domestic  4,395 95.9 4,812 94.1  4,262  94.0 
Non-exporter  3,744 81.7 3,839 75.1  3,524  77.7 
Exporter  651 14.2 973 19.0  738  16.3 
Multinational  190 4.2 300 5.9  273  6.1 
Non-exporter  81  1.8 139 2.7  111  2.5 
Exporter  109 2.4 161 3.2  162  3.6 
Total  4,585 100.0 5,112 100.0  4,535  100.0 
Source: Authors’ own calculations based on ENIA. 
 
Table 2: Mean Tests for Employment Growth 
  
  A. Domestic versus Multinationals, all plants 
 Domestic  Multinationals Difference  t-test 
1990-1995 -0.5  0.2  -0.7  -0.05 
1995-2000 -21.4  -21.9  0.4 0.63 
  
  A. Domestic versus Multinationals, only exporters 
 Domestic  Multinationals Difference  t-test 
1990-1995 0.0  -2.7 2.7  0.42 
1995-2000 -23.6  -16.2 -7.4 -1.09 
        
Notes:  Employment growth is defined as lnLt – lnLt-5. t-test is for the null 
hypotheses that difference in employment growth is equal to zero. 
 
  18Table 3: Plant Employment Growth Regressions 
 
  (3.1) (3.2) (3.3) 
  A: Employment growth
Size  -0.098 -0.096 -0.096 
  (11.40)** (11.25)** (11.22)** 
Age  -0.050 -0.047 -0.048 
  (4.72)** (4.44)** (4.47)** 
TFP  0.059 0.060 0.059 
  (7.23)** (7.35)** (7.15)** 
Exporter  0.096 0.096 0.096 
  (4.22)** (4.22)** (4.25)** 
Multinational  (MNC)  0.038 0.039 0.041 
  (0.87) (0.89) (0.94) 
1995-00  (Crisis)  -0.227 -0.236 -0.135 
 (15.53)**  (15.20)**  (4.28)** 
MNC * Crisis  -0.027  -0.030  -0.040 
  (0.43) (0.48) (0.64) 
Industry growth   -  -  0.263 
 -  -  (3.70)** 
Constant  0.141 0.112 0.077 
 (2.54)*  (1.93)  (1.31) 
     
  B: Selection Equation
Size   0.153  0.154 
   (9.19)**  (9.21)** 
Age   0.168  0.166 
   (9.25)**  (9.17)** 
TFP   0.124  0.120 
   (8.22)**  (7.97)** 
Exporter   -0.024  -0.024 
  19   (0.56)  (0.55) 
Multinational (MNC)    0.131  0.136 
   (1.05)  (1.09) 
1995-00 (Crisis)    -0.710  -0.538 
   (21.89)**  (7.58)** 
MNC * Crisis    -0.342  -0.355 
   (2.32)*  (2.42)* 
Industry growth     -  0.437 
   -  (2.74)** 
MES   0.011  -0.013 
   (0.05)  (0.06) 
Herfindahl   1.457  2.052 
   (1.00)  (1.38) 
Multinational share    0.411  0.042 
   (0.53)  (0.05) 
Observations  5738 8603 8603 
R-squared 0.10  -  - 
Wald Test Independent 
Equations 







Notes: Robust absolute value of t-statistics and z-statistics in parentheses. * 
significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%         
 
  20Table 4: Plant Employment Growth Regressions controlling for Average size 
 (4.1)  (4.2) 
  A: Employment growth
Average size  0.000  0.000 
 (1.97)*  (3.68)** 
Age -0.066  -0.039 
 (7.08)**  (3.99)** 
TFP 0.049  0.063 
 (6.71)**  (8.44)** 
Exporter -0.028  -0.023 
 (1.51)  (1.26) 
Multinational (MNC)  -0.004  0.009 
 (0.11)  (0.22) 
1995-00 (Crisis)  -0.109  -0.182 
 (3.91)**  (6.42)** 
Multinational * Crisis  -0.024  -0.063 
 (0.44)  (1.13) 
Industry growth   0.218  0.270 
 (3.51)**  (4.29)** 
Constant -0.150  -0.395 
 (3.29)**  (7.70)** 
  B: Selection Equation
Initial Size    0.216 
   (21.14)** 
Age   0.145 
   (11.44)** 
TFP   0.119 
   (13.40)** 
Exporter   -0.088 
   (3.33)** 
Multinational (MNC)    0.106 
  21   (1.95) 
1995-00 (Crisis)    -0.505 
   (12.60)** 
Multinational * Crisis    -0.346 
   (4.57)** 
Industry growth     0.459 
   (5.25)** 
MES   -0.067 
   (0.54) 
Herfindahl   1.669 
   (1.87) 
Multinational share    -0.282 
   (0.63) 
Constant   -0.704 
   (1.74) 
Observations 5738  8603 
R-squared 0.08  -- 
Notes: Robust absolute value of z-statistics in parentheses, * 
significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%     
Employment growth is defined as: [Lit-Lit-5]/[(Lit+Lit-5)/2], 
average size is [(Lit+Lit-5)/2] , and initial size is Lit-5.
  22Table 5: Plant Employment Growth Regressions and External Finance Dependence 
 
 (5.1)  5.(2)  (5.3)  (5.4) (5.5) (5.6) 
  A: Employment Growth
        
Initial  size  -0.096  -0.096  -0.094  
 (11.15)**   (11.15)**   (10.95)**   
Average  size   0.000  0.000  0.000 
   (3.45)**  (3.46)**  (3.82)**
Age  -0.046 -0.037 -0.045 -0.037 -0.049 -0.041 
 (4.21)**  (3.77)** (4.21)**  (3.77)** (4.62)** (4.25)**
TFP  0.059 0.065 0.059 0.065 0.057 0.061 
 (7.18)**  (8.46)** (7.18)**  (8.45)** (6.99)** (8.11)**
Exporter  0.099 -0.022 0.100 -0.021 0.100 -0.012 
 (4.30)**  (1.14)  (4.31)**  (1.13) (4.41)** (0.62) 
Multinational  (MNC)  -0.001 -0.036 0.019 -0.017 0.079 0.037 
 (0.02)  (0.63)  (0.35)  (0.36) (1.66) (0.87) 
1995-00 (Crisis)  -0.163  -0.202 -0.161 -0.199 -0.127 -0.170 
 (4.78)**  (6.45)** (4.76)**  (6.43)** (3.99)** (5.93)**
MNC*Crisis  0.027 -0.010 -0.013 -0.048 -0.051 -0.068 
 (0.26)  (0.11)  (0.20)  (0.80) (0.81) (1.21) 
EXD*Crisis  0.130 0.153 0.122 0.145     
 (2.26)*  (2.89)** (2.15)*  (2.80)**    
MNC*EXD  0.082 0.117 0.010 0.047     
  (0.44) (0.71) (0.09) (0.46)     
MNC*EXD*Crisis  -0.140  -0.132      
  (0.60)  (0.64)      
Industry  growth  0.277 0.323 0.279 0.324 0.267 0.273 
 (3.39)**  (4.35)** (3.41)**  (4.37)** (3.76)** (4.35)**
Interest/Sales  (INTS)       -0.143  -0.435 
       (0.76)  (1.78) 
  23INTS*Crisis       -0.469  -0.877 
       (0.84)  (1.86) 
MNC*INTS       -1.259  -0.923 
       (1.98)*  (1.46) 
Constant  0.077 -0.402 0.076 -0.402 0.082 -0.372 
 (1.32)  (7.66)** (1.30)  (7.68)** (1.40) (7.31)**
   
  24Table 5, cont. 
  B: Selection Equation
        
Initial  size  0.152  0.152  0.165  
 (8.95)**   (8.95)**   (9.71)**   
Age  0.165 0.144 0.165 0.144 0.162 0.141 
 (8.97)** (11.15)** (8.97)** (11.14)** (8.87)**  (11.01)**
TFP  0.123 0.121 0.123 0.121 0.113 0.112 
 (8.05)** (13.38)** (8.05)** (13.37)** (7.46)**  (12.62)**
Exporter  -0.036 -0.098 -0.036 -0.098 0.011 -0.051 
 (0.82)  (3.63)**  (0.82)  (3.63)** (0.24)  (1.85) 
Multinational  (MNC) 0.125 0.057 0.126 0.073 0.069 0.047 
 (0.71)  (0.68)  (0.72)  (0.83) (0.51) (0.65) 
1995-00 (Crisis)  -0.505  -0.484 -0.505 -0.481 -0.516 -0.488 
 (6.42)** (10.68)** (6.41)** (10.62)** (7.12)**  (11.59)**
MNC*Crisis  -0.438 -0.380 -0.441 -0.407 -0.318 -0.312 
 (2.08)*  (3.24)**  (2.10)*  (3.34)** (2.15)* (3.85)** 
EXD*Crisis  0.300 0.261 0.299 0.255     
  (1.86) (2.84)** (1.85) (2.77)**     
MNC*EXD  0.114 0.239 0.108 0.181     
  (0.26) (0.99) (0.24) (0.69)     
MNC*EXD*Crisis  0.189  0.018      
  (0.35)  (0.06)      
Industry  growth  0.678 0.665 0.679 0.667 0.432 0.455 
 (3.38)** (5.54)**  (3.38)** (5.56)**  (2.70)**  (5.18)** 
MES  0.143 0.015 0.142 0.015 -0.028  -0.081 
 (0.60)  (0.10)  (0.59)  (0.10) (0.14) (0.65) 
Herfindahl  3.298 2.398 3.295 2.398 2.376 1.948 
 (2.06)*  (2.48)*  (2.06)*  (2.48)* (1.60) (2.17)* 
Multinational  share  -0.792 -0.825 -0.793 -0.828 0.105 -0.244 
 (0.89)  (1.61)  (0.89)  (1.61) (0.13) (0.55) 
  25Interest/Sales  (INTS)       -1.402  -1.566 
       (2.79)**  (3.16)** 
INTS*Crisis       -2.318  -2.143 
       (2.32)*  (2.29)* 
MNC*INTS       1.665  1.399 
       (0.97)  (1.17) 
Constant  -1.196 -0.946 -1.195 -0.946 -0.662 -0.629 
 (1.54)  (1.96)*  (1.54)  (1.96)* (0.99)  (1.56) 
Observations  8338 8338 8338 8338 8338 8338 
Notes: Robust absolute value of z-statistics in parentheses. * significant at 5%; ** 
significant at 1%.  
Employment growth is defined in (1), (3), (5) as Ln(Lit) – Ln(Lit-5), and in (2), (4), (6) as: 
[Lit-Lit-5]/[(Lit+Lit-5)/2], average size is [(Lit+Lit-5)/2], and initial size is Lit-5.  
3-digit industry dummies are included, but not reported.  
 
  26Table 6: Plant Employment Growth Regressions with Alternative Financing Variables 
 
  (6.1) 6.(2) (6.3) (6.4) 





  A. Employment Growth
      
Initial  size  -0.097  -0.097  
 (11.17)**   (11.16)**  
Average  size   0.000  0.000 
   (3.38)**   (3.40)** 
Age  -0.047 -0.039 -0.047 -0.039 
 (4.35)**  (3.96)** (4.36)**  (3.95)** 
TFP  0.059 0.064 0.059 0.065 
 (7.15)**  (8.40)** (7.14)**  (8.40)** 
Exporter 0.104  -0.018  0.104  -0.018 
  (4.47)** (0.92) (4.46)** (0.93) 
Multinational 
(MNC) 
-0.308 -0.360 -0.220 -0.259 
 (1.54)  (2.00)*  (1.42)  (1.92) 
1995-00  (Crisis)  -0.064 -0.123 -0.093 -0.143 
 (1.14)  (2.48)*  (2.01)*  (3.48)** 
MNC*Crisis  0.622 0.470 0.405 0.306 
  (2.21)* (1.88) (1.96)* (1.67) 
LIQ*Crisis  -0.841 -0.631 -0.001 -0.001 
 (2.21)*  (1.85)  (2.26)*  (1.98)* 
MNC*LIQ  2.221 2.406 0.003 0.003 
  (1.84) (2.19)* (1.80) (2.18)* 
MNC*LIQ*Crisis  -4.325 -3.481 -0.005 -0.004 
  (2.36)* (2.16)* (2.19)* (2.07)* 
Industry  growth  0.137 0.191 0.121 0.177 
  27  (1.70) (2.54)* (1.47) (2.30)* 
Constant 0.080  -0.394  0.078  -0.397 
 (1.39)  (7.56)** (1.35)  (7.62)** 
 
  28Table 6, cont. 
 
  B. Selection Equation
      
Initial  size  0.151 0.164 0.151 0.213 
 (8.90)**  (8.90)**  (8.89)**  (18.44)** 
Age  0.164 0.142 0.163 0.142 
  (8.90)** (11.01)** (8.89)** (10.98)** 
TFP  0.125 0.124 0.125 0.123 
  (8.17)** (13.59)** (8.14)** (13.55)** 
Exporter  -0.034 -0.097 -0.034 -0.098 
  (0.76) (3.58)** (0.77) (3.60)** 
Multinational  (MNC)  -0.732 -0.628 -0.304 -0.240 
 (1.31)  (2.87)**  (0.79)  (1.45) 
1995-00  (Crisis)  -0.617 -0.593 -0.564 -0.541 
  (5.09)** (8.44)** (5.71)** (9.49)** 
MNC*Crisis  -0.171 -0.281 -0.400 -0.485 
 (0.26)  (0.86)  (0.88)  (2.00)* 
LIQ*Crisis  0.992 1.109 0.001 0.001 
  (1.15) (2.22)* (0.95) (2.14)* 
MNC*LIQ  6.322 5.281 0.005 0.004 
 (1.58)  (3.76)**  (1.22)  (2.46)* 
MNC*LIQ*Crisis -1.436  -0.486  0.000  0.002 
  (0.31) (0.22) (0.07) (0.64) 
Industry  growth  0.589 0.629 0.602 0.664 
  (2.92)** (5.69)** (2.83)** (5.73)** 
MES  0.072 0.085 0.082 0.123 
  (0.31) (0.59) (0.34) (0.83) 
Herfindahl  2.164 1.838 2.258 1.996 
  (1.45) (2.06)* (1.51) (2.23)* 
Multinational  share  -0.211 -0.607 -0.323 -0.804 
  29  (0.25) (1.30) (0.38) (1.69) 
Constant  -0.987 -1.168 -1.007 -1.270 
 (1.30)  (2.50)*  (1.30)  (2.66)** 
Observations  8338 8338 8338 8338 
Notes: Robust z statistics in parentheses. * significant at 5%; ** significant at 
1% 
LIQ is a measure of liquidity needs, either inventory over sales or cash 
conversion cycles.   
+ computed as the length in days between the moment a firm pays for its raw 
materials and the moment it is paid for the sale of its final output during the 
normal course of operations.  
  30Table 7: Plant Employment Growth Regressions and External Finance Dependence, 
Annual Data 
 
  (6.1) (6.2) (6.3) 
  A: Employment Growth
     
Initial  size  -0.034 -0.034 -0.034 
  (16.66)** (16.65)** (16.86)** 
Age  -0.013 -0.013 -0.013 
  (6.13)** (6.13)** (6.07)** 
TFP  0.026 0.026 0.025 
  (14.33)** (14.33)** (14.35)** 
Exporter  0.041 0.041 0.041 
  (7.91)** (7.89)** (8.18)** 
Multinational 
(MNC) 
-0.017 -0.010 0.006 
  (1.12) (0.76) (0.61) 
Crisis  -0.074 -0.072 -0.039 
  (6.64)** (6.54)** (4.18)** 
Crisis*MNC  0.047 0.027 0.023 
  (1.69) (1.41) (1.30) 
MNC*EXD 0.042  0.020   
 (1.20)  (0.68)   
Crisis*EXD 0.020  0.015   
 (1.40)  (1.08)   
Crisis*MNC*EXD -0.066     
 (1.06)     
Interest/Sales (INTS)      0.003 
     (0.05) 
INTS*Crisis     -0.209 
     (1.62) 
  31MNC*INTS     -0.255 
     (1.32) 
Constant 0.011  0.010  -0.018 
  (0.84) (0.81) (1.45) 
     
  32Table 7, cont. 
  B: Selection Equation
     
Initial  size  0.161 0.160 0.164 
  (12.50)** (12.49)** (13.00)** 
Age  0.111 0.111 0.114 
  (10.29)** (10.29)** (10.69)** 
TFP  0.135 0.135 0.129 
  (13.72)** (13.70)** (13.34)** 
Exporter  0.003 0.003 0.020 
  (0.09) (0.10) (0.69) 
Multinational 
(MNC) 
-0.101 -0.152 -0.079 
  (1.18) (2.00)* (1.25) 
Crisis  -0.670 -0.677 -0.593 
  (9.36)** (9.48)** (9.15)** 
MNC*Ints  -0.223 -0.088 -0.082 
  (1.62) (0.91) (0.89) 
Crisis*EXD 0.185  0.214   
 (2.17)*  (2.57)*   
MNC*EXD 0.025  0.204   
 (0.13)  (1.23)   
Crisis*MNC*EXD 0.477     
 (1.37)     
MES  -0.123 -0.122 -0.111 
  (0.97) (0.97) (0.92) 
Herfindahl  1.617 1.625 1.389 
  (2.22)* (2.22)* (1.99)* 
Multinational  share  0.361 0.360 0.224 
  (1.12) (1.12) (0.73) 
Interest/Sales (INTS)      -0.941 
  33     (3.89)** 
INTS*Crisis     -0.268 
     (0.61) 
MNC*INTS     -0.504 
     (0.56) 
Constant  0.509 0.508 0.490 
  (1.21) (1.21) (1.23) 
Observations  36029 36029 37180 
Notes: Robust z statistics in parentheses. * significant at 5%; ** 
significant at 1%.  
Employment growth is defined as Ln(Lit) – Ln(Lit-1) and initial size 
is Lit-1.  
3-digit industry dummies and full set of time dummies are included, 
but not reported. 
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Table 8: Plant Employment Growth Regressions with alternative size variable 
 
 (7.1)  (7.2) 
  A: Employment Growth








 (7.68)**  (7.27)** 
Employment>250 -0.080  -0.077 
 (10.34)**  (10.28)** 
Age -0.020  -0.016 
 (8.46)**  (7.46)** 
TFP 0.022  0.024 
 (10.57)**  (13.71)** 
Exporter 0.026  0.029 
 (4.95)**  (5.74)** 
Multinational (MNC)  -0.018  0.003 
 (1.21)  (0.34) 
Crisis -0.014  -0.025 
 (1.38)  (3.50)** 
Crisis*MNC 0.045  0.020 
 (1.59)  (1.13) 
MNC*EXD 0.044   
 (1.23)   
Crisis*EXD 0.015   
 (1.10)   
Crisis*MNC*EXD -0.067   
  35 (1.07)   
Industry growth  0.000  0.000 
 (1.56)  (1.01) 
Interest/Sales (INTS)    -0.008 
   (0.13) 
MNC*INTS   -0.252 
   (1.29) 
Crisis*INTS   -0.217 
   (1.66) 
Constant -0.087  -0.109 
 (5.28)**  (8.91)** 
  36Table 8, cont. 
 
  B: Selection Equation








 (4.89)**  (4.86)** 
Employment>250 0.243  0.255 
 (4.97)**  (5.29)** 
Age 0.114  0.129 
 (8.95)**  (12.20)** 
TFP 0.143  0.136 
 (14.62)**  (14.11)** 
Exporter 0.096  0.103 
 (3.16)**  (3.55)** 
Multinational (MNC)  -0.071  -0.052 
 (0.82)  (0.84) 
Crisis -0.283  -0.333 
 (6.14)**  (6.49)** 
Crisis*MNC -0.202  -0.070 
 (1.47)  (0.76) 
MNC*EXD 0.005   
 (0.03)   
Crisis*EXD 0.174   
 (2.05)*   
Crisis*MNC*EXD 0.471   
 (1.34)   
Industry growth  0.000  0.001 
  37 (0.26)  (0.56) 
MES -0.116  -0.073 
 (0.94)  (0.61) 
Herfindahl 1.387  1.339 
 (1.93)  (1.93) 
Multinational share  0.505  0.215 
 (1.58)  (0.70) 
Interest/Sales (INTS)    -0.905 
   (3.83)** 
MNC*INTS   -0.442 
   (0.51) 
Crisis*INTS   -0.209 
   (0.50) 
Constant 0.667  0.543 
 (1.63)  (1.38) 
Observations 36029    36029 
Notes: Robust z statistics in parentheses. * 
significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%.   
Employment growth is defined as Ln(Lit) – Ln(Lit-1)  
3-digit industry dummies and full set of time 
dummies are included, but not reported. 
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Appendix 
  
Appendix A: Variable Definitions 
 
Variable Description 
Size  Total employment (in logs) 
Age  1+year-first year a plant is observed (in logs) 
TFP Total  factor  productivity estimated using Levinsohn 
and Petrin (2003) methodology (in logs) 
Exporter  Dummy for exporter plants 
Multinational  Dummy for plants with positive foreign ownership 
participation 
External dependence   Industry external financial needs computed by Rajan 
and Zingales (1998) 
Interest/Sales  Interest payments over plant sales 
Industry growth  Employment industry growth between t-s and t 
Minimum efficient 
scale 
Median plant size (in terms of employment) in the 
industry.   
  
Herfindahl  The Herfindahl index defined in terms of plants’ 
share on industry sales. 
  





Appendix B: Correlation Table 
 




 Initial  Age  TFP  Exporter MNC  Crisis 
External 
Dependence DC*MNC EXD*MNC EXD*DC EXD*MNC*DC 
  size       (DC)  EXD         
Initial  size  1                  
Age  0.1835  1                
TFP 0.0694  0.0782  1                 
Exporter 0.4922  0.0612  0.0749 1               
MNC  0.1839 0.0004 0.0312 0.2205  1             





0.1093 0.0289 0.0391  0.0134  1         
DC*MNC  0.115 0.0187  0.0264  0.1364 0.553 0.196  0.0307  1       
EXD*MNC 0.1045  -0.0001 
-
0.0072 0.1472 0.7013  0.0173  0.2082  0.4134  1     





0.0368 0.0345 0.0323  0.6472  0.42  0.1666  0.1167  1   
EXD*MNC*DC 0.0627  0.0137 
-
0.0014 0.0965 0.3941  0.1397  0.1266  0.7126  0.5891  0.2667  1 









 Appendix C:  
 
Plant Employment Growth Regressions with four Firm Types 






    
Initial size  -0.097  0.152 
 (11.09)**  (8.95)** 
Age -0.045  0.165 
 (4.20)**  (8.98)** 
TFP 0.059  0.123 
 (7.07)**  (8.05)** 
Exporter   -0.036 
   (0.82) 
Multinational (MNC)    0.125 
   (0.71) 
1995-00 (Crisis)  -0.153  -0.505 
 (4.46)**  (6.42)** 
MNC*Crisis   -0.439 
   (2.09)* 
MNC*EXD 0.066  0.113 
 (0.36)  (0.25) 
EXD*Crisis 0.133  0.300 
 (2.30)*  (1.86) 
MNC*EXD*Crisis -0.109  0.189 
 (0.47)  (0.35) 
Industry growth  0.280  0.679 
 (3.44)**  (3.38)** 
Domestic Exporter  0.123   
  42(DEXP) 
 (3.94)**   
MNC Non Exporter 
(MNEXP) 
0.062  
 (0.97)   
MNC Exporter (MEXP)  0.072   
 (0.88)   
DEXP*Crisis -0.047   
 (1.16)   
MNEXP*Crisis -0.104   
 (0.80)   
MEXP*Crisis 0.086   
 (0.77)   
MES   0.143 
   (0.60) 
Herfindahl   3.303 
   (2.07)* 
Multinational share    -0.792 
   (0.89) 
Constant 0.078  -1.199 
 (1.33)  (1.54) 
Observations 8338  8338 
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